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The shi (±) class was split into military and civilian camps in the early Chunqiu (~~ 
f)( 770-476 B.C.). Society was then undergoing dramatic changes. The original highly 
hereditary system of public service (0~) was disintegrating. Many warriors could not 
find a career. They began to work for private houses (;v1.1 111), many of which had replaced 
the old aristocratic houses to become the dominant forces in the former vassal states. 
From these warriors came the earliest group of xia (1~), who provided services for their 
nusters, such as fighting in battle or conducting an assassination. The xia warriors were 
extremely active through the whole period of the Warring States (irtIGl~ 475-221 B.C.), 
but under the brutal regime of Qin (* 221-207 B.C.) they were forced underground 
and disappeared from the front stage of the political arena. The anti-Qin rebellion and 
founding of the Western Han (Tt§?~l 202 B.C.-8) revitalized the xia and also changed the 
nature of the classical xia. In this article, the development of the xia in the Western Han 
dynasty is extensively introduced and carefully analyzed, with a focus on the xia's general 
position in society and its relationship with both the central and local authorities. The 
most famous Han xia figure, Guo Xie (!JIS1~¥), is singled out for examination, as he will 
fully demonstrate the characteristics of the xia at the time. 
The xia and the founding of the Han empire 
The founding of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. was one of the most significant 
historical events in Chinese history. It marked the end of a long period of chaotic wars 
and social instability, and the beginning of two millennia of primarily unified and 
centralized imperial regimes. 
Under the repression of the First Emperor of Qin's reign (221-210 B.C.), the xia, who 
had been extremely active in the arena of interstate conflict, seem to have been forced 
underground. However, along with the loyalists of the defeated former feudal states, 
they were waiting for their season to come again. This happened unexpectedly soon. 
The Qin regime lasted only fifteen years before it was toppled by the joint uprising 
of peasants and aristocrats of the former feudal states. The xia immediately joined the 
growing tide against the Qin and actively involved themselves in the battles among 
rival warlords. 
88 Zhao 
At the head of the uprising against the Qin stood the Xiang (J]) family. This family 
had produced a long line of men with military careers in the former state of Chu (~). 
Its last prominent member during the Warring States was Grand General Xiang Yan (J] 
~ d. 224 B.C.), who was killed in the war between Qin and Chu. His son Xiang Liang 
(J]W; d. 208 B.C.) was compelled by the Qin to move his family from his native place 
after killing a person there. In his new location in Kuaiji (~fW in present day Zhejiang) 
he retained many men and privately gave them military training. His commitment 
to the welfare of the locality as a self-appointed organizer and benefactor earned him 
support from both landowners and general populace. 
Two months after Chen Sheng (1)~UWf d. 209 B.C.) launched his uprising, Xiang Liang 
assassinated the chief of the prefecture and formed an army of eight thousand men 
to join the rebel forces north of the Yangtze.' In taking upon himself matters of local 
welfare, he was behaving somewhat like a xia. But he was different from the pre-Qin 
xia and warriors in his brutality, trickery, ambition and manipulation. I believe that he 
was driven more by his appetite for power than by his sense of justice. His aristocratic 
family background and his life as a commoner made him a combination of the noble 
and commoner xia, demonstrating a new aspect of the post-Qin xia, which will be 
discussed in detail later in this article. 
Unlike the other prominent members of the family, Xiang Liang's younger brother 
Xiang Bo (JJHI~I d. 192 B.C.) is said to have been mild tempered. He was committed 
more to loyalty in personal friendship. When the Xiang family had to leave its native 
town, Xiang Bo fled to his friend Zhang Liang (5:&.& d. 189 B.C.) for refuge. Later 
Zhang became an important advisor to Liu Bang (fU:fo~ r. 202-195 B.C.), the arch-rival 
of the Xiang family. When Xiang Bo became aware that his nephew Xiang Yu (JJi~~ 
232-202 B.C.) intended to destroy Liu Bang's forces, he went to see his friend Zhang 
Liang and asked Zhang to return with him. When Zhang told him that he was obliged 
by his conscience to stay with Liu, Xiang Bo agreed to persuade his nephew to give 
up the plan to attack Liu Bang. As on many later occasions, Xiang Bo successfully 
protected Liu Bang and his family.2 He placed the code of brotherhood and personal 
loyalty over the interests of his family, typical conduct of the xia of the pre-Qin era. 
Xiang Liang's nephew Xiang Yu, commander of the rebel forces for almost five years, 
is described by Sima Qian (\:I] ,~~) as heroic and vigorous. He learned swordsmanship 
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after failing to become a scholar as his family had expected. He was more ambitious 
and egocentric than his uncle Xiang Liang. When he saw the First Emperor on an 
inspection tour, he declared that the arrogant emperor could be replaced, causing his 
uncle to cover his mouth for fear his words would be overheard. 3 Although Xiang 
Yu cannot simply be labeled a xia, he possessed some of the characteristics that were 
associated with the xia, such as bravery, determination and personal integrity. Liang 
Qichao (t{{:§Mf) in his Zhongguo zhi Wushidao (r=/=I 1!lzlEt-J:-~), or The Chinese "Wtzyof 
the "Wtzrrior, listed three of his encounters to show the development of his image as a 
heroic knight: 
With his newly assembled motley army, he challenged the awe-inspiring Qin 
by rushing to the rescue of the state of Zhao. Is that not chivalrous (~1%)? 
Unable to endure any longer the people's suffering from wars, he challenged 
Liu Bang to a duel. Is that not benevolent and heroic (1=~)? When besieged 
at Gaixia (±tCF), he refused to escape to his home base across the Yangtze 
for feeling too ashamed to see his elders. This is the countenance of a true 
knight!4 
Liang's account is somewhat romanticized. Xiang Yu's rescue of Zhao, I believe, was 
more likely driven by his ambition to resume the leadership of the uprising following 
the death of his uncle. The suggestion of a once-and-for-all duel between him and Liu 
Bang was entirely unrealistic when his armies faced certain defeat. However, Xiang 
Yu's refusal to retreat to his home district did show the true color of a hero, who was 
convinced that ill fortune had doomed him, despite his military efforts and personal 
bravery. Remaining calm and undaunted, he awaited his fate. In this respect, Xiang Yu 
was close in temperament to the classical xia. Yet at the same time, Xiang Yu and those 
like him introduced new elements, like political ambition and an overbearing manner, 
into xia behavior and also increased the level of brutality and rebelliousness. As will be 
seen later, the development of the Han xia was primarily in this less noble direction. 
Zhang Er (sjfll=), a native of Wei (~~) and one of the leaders of the anti-Qin uprising, 
was Prince Xinling's ({§~£tn retainer in his youth. He had to leave his home town, 
probably because of violating the Qin law. He later became rich in his place of exile 
by marrying a woman from a wealthy family. He then began to retain people from a 
distance beyond even a thousand Li. Among his retainers were Chen Yu (~~), later an 
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important leader in the uprising, and Liu Bang, then a commoner. After Qin annexed 
the state of Wei, both Zhang and Chen were declared wanted by the Qin government. 
All their property was confiscated and they went into hiding. Later they used assumed 
names to make their living as gate-keepers until the revolt began. s 
Ji Bu (*:1IJ) , a general in Xiang Yu's army, became famous in Chu for he was depicted 
as "acting recklessly and chivalrously" (1.?,A1f1iJt). There was a common saying: "A 
hundred catties of pure gold are not as good as one of Ji Bu's promises." On the 
battlefield Ji Bu several times pushed Liu Bang into a tight corner. Liu thus held a bitter 
grudge against him for his humiliation. After Liu Bang defeated Xiang Yu's forces and 
subjected all the remaining lords to his rule, he offered a reward of a thousand catties 
of gold for the capture of Ji Bu. The emperor ordered that whoever dared protect him 
would be killed along with his whole family. However, many people risked their lives 
not only to hide Ji Bu but also to help him escape his misfortune. Among them were 
the most famous xia of the time, Zhu Jia (**) and the chivalric general Xiahou Ying 
(J[ 1*M). The latter successfully persuaded Liu Bang to pardon Ji Bu.6 The incidents 
surrounding Ji Bu's rescue seem to demonstrate that the xia character and xia behavior 
were broadly accepted both among the common people and officialdom. 
The anti-Qin forces consisted in the main of four components: peasants like the 
initiator of the uprising Chen Sheng, city vagrants and scoundrels like Han Xin (lji!1~ d. 
196 B.C.), junior government officials like Liu Bang and former nobles like Xiang Yu 
and Tian Heng (133 iPi). 
The former nobles who participated in the anti-Qin uprising almost succeeded in 
reviving the old order of independent states. The classic way of the xia of the previous 
Warring States era was also partially preserved among the members of this group. Like 
Xiang Yu, Tian Heng was one of the famed warriors from the nobility. As members 
of the former royal family of Qi, Tian Heng and his brothers took advantage of the 
uprising to seize back the power they had lost in the Qin unification of the country. 
However, when caught between the forces of Xiang Yu and Liu Bang, they had to 
take side with one of the rivals in order to survive. Tian was a strong opponent of the 
Liu forces. After Liu became emperor, Tian fled to an island in east with 500 or so of 
his followers, in fear of punishment. Worrying about their possible revolt later, the 
emperor sent an envoy to pardon Tian for his offenses and summon him to the capital. 
The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 91 
Regarding acknowledging Liu as his ruler as an unbearable shame, Tian committed 
suicide on his way to the capital, and so did his 500 men? Like Xiang Yu, Tian Heng 
was a classic noble warrior. He treated his people well and they were all willing to die 
for him. His heroic death became a source of inspiration to the braves of later ages. 
Liang Qichao ardently praised Tian and his five hundred followers and claimed that it 
was their heroic deeds that brought the eight-hundred-year history of Qi to a glorious 
. . 8 
termmatIOn. 
Liu Bang, the founder of the Han Dynasty, was quite a different kind of person. His 
immediate origins were part city rogue and part junior government official. Unlike his 
arch-rival, Xiang Yu, who was from a prominent warrior family, Liu Bang came from 
an obscure peasant family. According to his biography in the Shi Ji (5I:~c), he had no 
intention to becoming a farmer like his father and elder brothers. He became a junior 
official but was not really devoted to his work. Instead he indulged himself in wine and 
women and led an idle life. However, he was also generous and his easy temperament 
made him attractive to many people. Once he was sent on a mission to escort a batch 
of labor-draftees to Lishan (Ii Ill) for hard labor. Many fled on the way. It seemed to 
him that very few would be left when they reached their destination and no doubt he 
would be punished for his failure to bring them all there. Liu Bang decided to let the 
remaining criminals go and to hide himself A small number of the men were willing to 
follow him. He thus became the leader of a gang of outlaws even before the uprising. 
Once the uprising occurred, Liu Bang's former colleagues found him, and together 
they built a force oflocal people to join the tidal wave against Qin. 9 
In his behavior, Liu Bang reflected his lower social origins, while Xiang Yu exemplified 
more the style of the landowning aristocracy. But they seem to have had one thing in 
common: their ambition. Sa Mengwu (~i~iEt) wrote that in the course of China's 
history there were two kinds of people who had the ambition and capacity to contend 
for the throne. One consisted of members of influential noble families, that is haozu 
(~jj*), the other consisted of rogues. His explanation was: "Influential noble families 
could take advantage of their privileged position to obtain power; while scoundrels 
and rogues had no scruples and would gamble everything."ID Most contenders for the 
throne came from the former group. Those in the latter group usually had their chance 
in a widespread, chaotic peasant uprising. Liu Bang's success was the most famous 
example of this second type. 
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It is noteworthy that many of Liu Bang's military associates came from a similar 
background. Ban Gu (fJllIll) in his preface to Han Shu U~:;:), or Han History, listed 
a few of them: "Han Xin (~f~) was a man who struggled along on the verge of 
starvation, Ying Bu (~J$) a criminal with his face tattooed, Peng Yue (Sf3~) a bandit, 
and Wu Rui (-Yl:PG) a man of low social status. They all rode on the tide of the time and 
became nobles." 1 1 Almost all of Liu Bang's prominent aides except Zhang Liang (5~1~) 
came from humble origins. 
Zhang Liang, Liu Bang's senior adviser, was born to a noble family in the state of Han 
(~IT~). For five generations, members of his family had served as chief ministers. When 
the state of Han was annexed by Qin, Zhang Liang was still a young man who had 
not yet started his career. He sold off all his family's property to hire an assassin to kill 
the First Emperor of Qin. He put his plan into operation when the emperor was on 
an eastward inspection tour. However, the assassin attacked the wrong carriage. Zhang 
Liang escaped, changed his name and hid in a place called Xiapi cr1iI~). His biography 
in the Shi Ji has the following note: "During the years he stayed at Xiapi, he conducted 
himself as a xia. When Xiang Bo killed a man, he hid himself in Zhang Liang's place." 
When the uprising started, Zhang quickly organized hundreds of young men to 
d . jJ respon to It. -
Among the important assistants of Liu Bang, Chen Ping ([{JIPf), Wang Ling (.£ 
I~), Luan Bu (~1fi), Chen Xi (IIJR5ffff) and Fan Kuai (~U@") all possessed the xia 
temperament. The young Chen Ping was so poor that his house even lacked a door, 
but in front of it wealthy and influential people often left their carriages when they 
visited Chen. 1.3 Wang Ling offended Liu Bang in defending his friend Yong Chi (~fiID). 
This almost cost him his noble title. 14 Luan Bu's loyalty to his former lord Zang Tu O~ 
*) almost cost him his own life. 1 5 Chen Xi admired Prince Xinling and like him kept 
a huge number of retainers. He once passed by Handan (~'rs,~) on his way home and 
took with him over one thousand carriages of retainers, who filled up all the official 
guest houses in the town. 16 Fan Kuai was the most heroic of Liu Bang's warrior. At 
the critical moment in the Hongmen Banquet U:rr~I'i~*), it was Fan Kuai who bravely 
rushed to the rescue of Liu Bang. 17 Together these men brought the xia temperament 
and life style into early Han officialdom. 
The Han Dynasty was founded as a result of prolonged military struggle. After two 
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decades of quiescence under the severe Qin dictatorship, the xia across the land 
returned to the center of the stage, which they had occupied in the Warring States 
period. But in comparison to their Warring States predecessors, the xia and xia-like 
figures who founded the Han Dynasty were different in several ways. 
Most important are the following: 1.) They were not as closely allied with the shi C::I:) 
class, and came largely from the lower levels of society. Consequently, the culture and 
education usually present in a Chunqiu xia were diminished or simply non-existent. 
Xiang Yu, Liu Bang, Han Xin and Lu Huan are all said to have had some "scholar 
training" (~t!f) when they were young, but they did not pursue this. Liu Bang's 
training was enough for him to pass the selection test to become a junior official (~tt~ 
~), but he was notorious for his anti-scholar attitudes. 2.) The shi class had changed. 
In the past it had been composed largely of warriors, but now it consisted mainly of 
intellectuals. Most of the Han xia came from other social classes. The shi were no 
longer the major s~urce of xia. By the founding of the Han, the xia were on their 
way to be more of a lifestyle and spiritual inclination than a concrete social entity. 3.) 
Most of the xia involved in founding the Han were ambitious. The unification by Qin 
remodeled Chinese society and uprooted the old feudal system. Officials appointed by 
the government replaced the hereditary nobles; prefectures and counties replaced the 
feudal states. When the suppressed xia were suddenly freed from the Qin tyranny in 
the country-wide rebellion, they found themselves cast into the political arena without 
allegiance to any individual persons or groups. The uprising created the unprecedented 
opportunity for them to become generals and even lords in their own right. In this 
regard Sima Qian made an interesting observation at the end of Ji Bu's biography: 
The Grand Historian remarks: with a spirit like that of Xiang Yu, Ji Bu made 
a name for daring in Chu. From time to time he commanded armies and 
several times seized the enemy pennants. He deserves to be called a brave 
man. Yet he suffered punishment and disgrace and became a slave and' did 
not commit suicide. Why did he stoop to this? Because he chose to rely upon 
his abilities. Therefore he suffered disgrace without shame, for there were 
things he hoped to accomplish and he was not yet satisfied. Thus in the end 
he became a renowned general of Han. Truly the wise man regards death as 
a grave thing. When slaves and scullery maids and such mean people in their 
despair commit suicide it is not because they are brave; it is because they 
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know that their plans and hopes will never again have a chance of coming 
true!18 
In general, switching loyalty to the enemy of one's former lord was unacceptable for 
classic warriors and xia as well. This does not mean that there were not cases where a 
warrior or a xia in the pre-Qin period might shift his loyalty. But when he found a lord 
who appreciated his ability and service, he would rarely change his loyalty, regardless 
of what fonunes befell his lord. Yu Rang (f~~jl), the famous Chunqiu xia, shifted his 
loyalty twice before he found a lord who appreciated his ability and recognized him 
as a guoshi (~Ij:), or a state knight. His first two lords had paid little attention to his 
existence. He thus felt no obligation to take revenge for them and actually shifted his 
loyalty to their killer, his third lord, Zhibo (~1B). When Zhibo was later killed, Yu 
Rang took great pains to plan revenge on the murderer. When his plan failed, Yu Rang 
took his own life. Despite Yu Rang's steadfast loyalty to his dead lord, no historical 
record mentioned his contribution as a guoshi when Zhibo was in power. He never 
tried to stop Zhibo' s suicidal policy of making enemies everywhere. His sole virtue was 
his uncompromising loyalty. 
In the early Han, loyalty was still regarded as an important ingredient of the 
xia personality, but self-fulfillment was gaining more weight, as was the further 
development of a warlike character. In Ji Bu's case, the transfer of loyalty caused 
apparently no embarrassment to either Ji Bu or the historian, because Ji Bu's full 
expression of his abilities outweighed his commitment to personal loyalty. Ji Bu's 
change of loyalty and Tian Heng's choice of death to preserve his integrity demonstrate 
the common pursuit of individual goals from two seemingly opposite ends. While Ji 
Bu endured all kinds of humiliation in order to survive, Tian Heng maintained that 
the only way to defend his dignity was to die. Both indicate the awakening of xia 
individualism. As we will see in the following sections, this was to add a new element 
to the original simplicity of the xia personality. 
Xia influences on early Han official behavior 
As the previous section has shown, many xia and xia-tempered figures were involved 
in the anti-Qin uprising and the founding of the Han Dynasty. They became generals, 
ministers and even lords in the new regime. The 5hi Ji describes the situation in the 
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early Han as follows: "There were sporadic outbreaks of wars. Even after all within 
the four seas were pacified, education was still not an urgent matter of the moment. 
During the reigns of the Emperor Hui (!-:m r 195-187 B.C.) and Empress Lu Us 
Fa r. 188-179 B.C.), nobles and ministers were all vigorous veterans with meritorious 
military service." 19 The Qin Dynasty had adopted Legalism as its official ideology and 
banned almost all the other philosophical schools. From the collapse of Qin to the 
establishment of Confucianism as the official ideology of Han Dynasty under the reign 
of Emperor Wu Ullitm r. 141-87 B.C.), there was toleration of different opinions 
and lifestyles. For many of the former rebels and military veterans who now made up 
officialdom and who were searching for a new identity, the chivalric and uninhibited 
lifestyle of "the four princes" (1ZY0~) in the Warring States held out a fascination. 
Furthermore, since most of these nobles came from the lower strata of society, they 
bore a natural affinity for youxia (iht1>JO ethics, as revealed in the spirit of brotherhood 
and the demands of revenge. Thus a mixture of noble xia and commoner youxia 
characterized early Han officialdom. 
Liu Bang's dislike of scholars is well known. There were only a few prominent scholars 
in his camp. The first to join was Li Yiji (JmI)jtJ~~). When he went to see Liu wearing 
his scholar's robe and hat, Liu said he was busy with matters of great importance and 
had no time to meet scholars. It was only after Li angrily claimed he was actually a 
drunkard that he met Liu Bang and became his advisor.20 The second example was 
Shusun Tong (,f~f*:im), an "erudite" (t~J:) in the Qin court. He became Liu Bang's 
advisor and pleased his new lord by changing his scholar's robe to a shorter gown. 
He never recommended his scholar peers to Liu Bang. Those he recommended were 
exclusively former bandits and xia, because he thought Liu Bang needed zhuangshi (;I± 
±), or heroic warriors and knights, to assist him in his bid for the throne. 21 Even after 
Liu Bang put the crown on his head, he still sought zhuangshi to defend his newly 
founded regime. Once after he had drunk much wine in his native town, the emperor 
sang a song of his own making, while playing the zhu (fFL), a local instrument: "The 
great wind rose to blow away the clouds. With my glory covering the whole country I 
return home. Now how to find brave warriors to guard the territory of the country?"n 
It is natural that in the early days of the Han Dynasty the noble class was still highly 
militant in spirit and attracted to heroic deeds. Even in the presence of the emperor, 
the nobles, most of whom were formerly zhuangshi, would drink wine and dispute 
with one another as to the ranking of their military exploits. When they became high 
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spirited under the influence of alcohol, they brandished their swords and struck the 
pillars of the palace, while a din filled the whole court. 23 
These scenes evoke recollections of the Warring States. Many historians noticed the 
similarity between the two periods. The author of the Hou Han Shu (1ki~H~f), or 
History of the Later Han, Fan Ye GQ]I~ 398-445), described the time as follows: 
After the founder of Han rose with his sword, warriors grew vigorously in 
number. [In the early Han] the law was lenient and the rites were simple. 
Inheriting the boldness of the four princes, the people harbored disobedient 
thoughts in their mind. They despised death and valued their personal 
integrity. They would requite any favor they received and avenge any insult 
they suffered. Orders from private houses were enforced and authority was 
usurped by commoners. Xia conduct had become the custom.24 
Fan Ye's observation refers to the activities of the xia in both upper and lower society. 
During the Qin regime xia activity was limited mainly to the lower ranks of society. 
After the victory of the rebels and the founding of the Han Dynasty, xia behavior 
spread into upper ranks of society as the former warriors and youxia became ministers 
and nobles. The penetration of higher society by the xia during the Han Dynasty, in 
particular the early Han, can been seen in three areas. 
First, xia behavior was common to many nobles, ministers and ranking officials. Zhang 
Er, who I introduced in the previous section as a xia and a prominent military leader 
in the rebel forces, was appointed Lord of Zhao (j11[E) by Liu Bang. When he died two 
years later in 198 B.C., his son Zhang Ao (5~1:&), who married Liu Bang's daughter 
Princess Luyuan (f~7c0.:t), succeeded him as Lord of Zhao. In 196 B.C. Liu Bang 
stayed with him during an inspection tour. Zhang waited upon the emperor day and 
night like a son. The emperor treated him rudely by often scolding him in the presence 
of his subordinates, some of whom, such as Guan Gao (ffiti%) , the premier of Zhao, 
and Zhao Wu (jt1r!:F) , were infuriated. They went to the lord and told him that they 
would kill the emperor. Without their lord's support, Guan and Zhao later plotted to 
assassinate the emperor when he came through their state during his Dongyuan (Jlt!:J[) 
inspection tour. The emperor avoided assassination only because he changed his tour 
schedule. The conspiracy was found and the lord was arrested. When a dozen of the 
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lord's ministers were hurrying to cut their own throats, Guan Gao decided to testifY 
that the lord was innocent. When he was brought before the inquisitors he told them, 
"I and my group alone are responsible. The lord knew nothing about it!" The prison 
officials, hoping to force a confession, gave him several thousand lashes and pierced 
him with needles until there was no spot on his body left to pierce, but he would say 
nothing more. When the Minister of Justice told the emperor of the interrogation of 
Guan Gao, the emperor was impressed by his bravery. He then sent a friend of Guan's, 
Xiegong UtIt0), to find out whether the lord was personally involved in the scheme. 
Guan convinced him that the lord was truly innocent. The Lord of Zhao was thus 
released. 
The emperor greatly admired Guan Gao for standing by his word so 
faithfully and sent Xiegong to inform him that Zhang Ao had already been 
released and that Guan Gao was pardoned as well. "Has my lord really been set 
free?" asked Guan Gao joyfully. "He has," replied Xiegong. "And because the 
emperor admires you," he added, "He has pardoned you as well. "The reason 
I did not choose death before, but suffered every torture that my body could 
endure, was so I could bear witness that Lord Zhang was not disloyal. Now 
that the lord has been released, my duty is fulfilled and I may die without 
regret. As a subject I have incurred the name of a would-be usurper and 
assassin. With what face could I appear again before the emperor? Though 
he might spare my life, would I not feel shame in my heart?25 
For Guan Gao and his comrades, the dignity of their lord was as inviolable as their own. 
Dignity was most sacred to a man of xia temperament. Once it was violated, he would 
either avenge himself on the offender or, if forced by circumstance, commit suicide. In 
the above case, revenge against the emperor was the intent. When the plotters' scheme 
failed, Guan Gao took upon himself the task of proving the innocence of his lord, 
while the others committed suicide. Guan gained wide fame for his conduct in the 
incident. The emperor was himself moved by Guan's bravery and loyalty. He pardoned 
Guan, the chief plotter, and promoted those who defied his order by accompanying 
their unfortunate lord to trial to be state premiers and prefectural governors. 
Yuan Ang (:R~) was a highly important and influential official in the early Han period. 
His father was a former rebel (&tM~) in the rebellion against the Qin. Yuan Ang was 
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said to be a man of unyielding integrity and principle. When he worked as a junior 
advisory official in the court of Emperor Wen u~t)(* r. 179-157 B.C.), he directed 
criticism at the emperor's favorite brother, the emperor's chosen concubine, the prime 
minister, and even the emperor himself. At the same time, he made many friends 
among local community leaders (5~~£:&~) and fellow officials during his official 
career. Among them, a few were prominent xia. Ji Xin (*{,), Ji Bu's younger brother, 
enjoyed equal fame with his brother for his bravery and xia character. Ji Xin once killed 
an enemy and fled for shelter to Yuan Ang, who was then premier of WU. 26 Another 
leading xia of the time, Ju Meng (~IJ~), was also Yuan's close friend. One of Yuan's 
friends warned him that Ju was merely a gambler and wondered why Yuan should keep 
a friend like him. Sima Qian recorded Yuan's answer as follows: 
Ju Meng is a gambler, but when his mother died the carriages of over 1,000 guests 
appeared to attend her funeral. So he must be something more than an ordinary 
man. Moreover, everyone sooner or later finds himself in serious trouble. But if 
one morning you were to go with your troubles and knock on Ju Meng's gate, 
he would not put you off with excuses about responsibility to his parents, or try 
to avoid the issue because of the danger to himself. The only men you can really 
count on in the world are Ji Xin and Ju Meng. 27 
Yuan touched the essence of xia behavior in his remark. Giving help to people in 
distress without thought of personal gain or loss formed the kernel of xia behavior. 
Yuan was famed for his outspokenness. When one of his important proposals was not 
adopted by Emperor Jing (i~Jf:3il-: r. 157-141 B.C.), he asked for leave on account of 
his poor health. Although Emperor Jing's envoys continued to consult him on policy 
matters, Yuan immersed himself in lower society, attending cockfights and dog-racing 
with his friends and followers. Because he opposed the appointment as crown prince of 
the emperor's favorite brother, Lord Xiao of Liang CY{~~3:.), the latter sent an assassin 
to kill him. The assassin was so impressed by Yuan's popular renown as a worthy man 
that, instead of killing Yuan, he told him of his secret mission. However, in the end 
Yuan did not escape assassination because Lord Xiao sent someone else to perform the 
task. 28 
The second point of note with regard to the new role of the xia is the return to the 
practice in the early Han of retaining 5hi (±), both scholars and xia were included 
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as shi. They served in both official and military capacities. In the early Han, nobility 
and officialdom both realized that by retaining 5hi they could increase their power and 
influence. The practice of retaining shi also demonstrated their personal wealth and 
magnanimity. Ban Gu in his preface to Biographies of Ybuxia (i1j~f)Hi) summarized the 
situation in the following statement: 
When Han was newly founded, the law was lenient. [The habitual practice 
of retaining personal followers represented by the four princes in the Warring 
States] was not rectified. For this reason, Chen Xi, premier of Dai (1-t), could 
be followed by a thousand carriages, while the lords ofWu (~) and Huainan 
OffT¥]) could all engage retainers up to thousands. The imperial kinsmen and 
ministers like Dou Yin (.~) and Tian Fen (EE1~) competed in the capital 
with each other (seeking retainers]' while the commoner youxia like Ju Meng 
and Guo Xie (~~j9r(:) ran wild in the alleys and lanes. Their influence was 
exercised in the regions and their strength was greater than that of lords and 
marquises. Their fame and prestige were highly regarded and they became 
the envy of the populace. 29 
The Lord of Wu (~3:') was Liu Bang's nephew. He ruled Wu's three prefectures and 
fifty-three cities for over forty years. During that time, he welcomed refugees and 
fugitives from all over the country and used them to work the copper mines and salt 
pans in his state. With his wealth he attracted "Heroes of the world" CKT~;1:) to 
his court. When other prefectures and states requested extradition of their escaped 
criminals, he ordered his officials to refuse all demands. This was regarded at the time 
as conduct typical of the noble xia. When the central government attempted to reduce 
the territory and powers of the vassal states, he allied himself with six other states and 
raised an abortive rebellion against the Han.30 
The Lord of Wu was not alone in this regard. Retaining 5hi was a commo"n practice 
among the lords of the vassal states, especially those with inordinate political ambitions. 
There was an institutional reason for this. In the early Han, imperial kinsmen were 
normally appointed as lords of the vassal states, the size and location of the state 
being determined according to their position in the royal house. But their power 
was limited because administration, law enforcement and military operations were 
administered by officials such as the xiang (t-§) , neishi (i*J 51:) and zhongwei (I=j::l ~t), 
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who were directly appointed by the central government. Only with the consent of 
these imperial appointees could a lord execute his orders. Emperor Jing's son, Lord 
Jing of Zhongshan ('::j::l[lJ~f=EE), once reflected upon the normal life of a vassal lord. He 
criticized his brother, the Lord of Zhao (JmI), for taking the duties of his officials into 
his own hands, declaring that a lord should instead devote himself daily to recreational 
activities.3' However, there were many lords like the Lord of Zhao. His senior relation, 
the Lord of Wu, was able to turn the central government's appointees into mere 
figureheads. What was a problem for the vassal lords was mobilizing the state army. 
Even if they brought the commanders over to their side, the local armed forces were 
not strong enough to resist armed intervention by the central government. So the lords 
retained and recruited warriors, youxia, migrants and even criminals at large to form 
their personal forces, which they used either to further their influence or protect their 
own interests. 
Lord Xiao of Liang (~~4I) is an example of the first case. As Emperor Jing's brother, 
he was determined to be the successor. He retained a huge number of haojie (~~), 
or vigorous men, from all over the country. The treasury and wealth he amassed were 
greater than that of the central government. Several hundred thousand weapons were 
privately manufactured in his state so that he could arm a future military.32 The Lord 
of Hengshan (f~J UJ :E) illustrates the second case. He also built a secret armed force, but 
for a different purpose. He could not get along with his brother, the neighboring Lord 
of Huainan. Upon hearing that his brother was preparing for an uprising against the 
central government, he reacted "with determination to recruit retainers of his own" out 
of fear that he would become the first target of his ambitious brother. 33 
The retention of shi by non-royal family nobles was also politically motivated, although 
they were less ambitious since by practice they had no potential to become lord or 
emperor. For them, shi consolidated their position and extended their influence. As 
mentioned in Ban Gu's statement above, Dou Ying and Tian Fen were two prominent 
ministers in the court of Emperor Wu and both committed themselves to retain large 
numbers of shi. The number of shi they retained was indicative of their political rise and 
fall. Dou was Empress Xiao Wen's cousin. Sima Qian in Dou's biography specifically 
pointed out that he "liked to keep retainers" (%J[~). After he led the imperial forces 
to defeat the rebel army of seven vassal states, he was given the title of Marquis Weiqi 
(IDllJ~;1*). Many shi rushed to pledge allegiance to him. But his prestige was waning 
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and he was challenged by Marquis Wuan (:liX1(W~), Tian Fen, Empress Jing's brother. 
They competed with each other to win more shi and other followers to broaden their 
influence. The more shrewd Tian won out over Dou and became prime minister. A 
large number of shi and nobles across the country attached themselves to him, among 
them many of Dou's former retainers and followers.,=>4 
The third point in regard to the role of the xia in the early Han is that besides retaining 
shi to form their private forces, the nobles and ministers took pride in associating with 
renowned xia. Wei Qing (i~JW), Emperor Wu's chief commander of his armies, had a 
friendship with Guo Xie (~15Wt-), the most well known youxia of the time according to 
Sima Qian. When the emperor began to contain the youxia and other regional powerful 
groups by moving them to places under the government's direct supervision, Guo's 
name was one of those on the list. General Wei talked to the emperor on Guo's behalf, 
claiming his friend should not be included. The general's plea made the emperor more 
determined to remove Guo, because he did not wish to see a commoner have such 
great influence. One Shi]i scholar observed that only twice in his life had General Wei 
interceded with the emperor on behalf of a friend. 35 
Making friends with prominent youxia was not rare among high profile generals in the 
early Han. Emperor Jing's general commander Zhou Yafu (J8JTIlI::k) acted the same way. 
When the Lord of Wu and six other vassal lords began their rebellion against the Han 
central government, Zhou was appointed taiwei U(Jff,~·), Defense Minister, to lead the 
army to put down the rebellion. When the army reached Luoyang, he met the renowned 
youxia Ju Meng and they became friends. General Zhou later made this comment: 
"Since Wu and Chu started their rebellion without support from Ju Meng, I know they 
will not succeed!" Sima Qian's comment on this incident reads: "When the country 
was put in a turmoil, the significance of obtaining Ju Meng for the Grand General 
was like winning a victory over an enemy state. ,,36 Sima Qian may have overstated the 
significance ofZhou's befriending Ju, but this episode indicates that at certain times the 
youxia played important roles in the power struggles within the ruling class. 
The xia and their local influence 
When the xia first emerged on the Chunqiu stage, they reflected largely the moral 
and behavioral features of the warrior class of that time. The xia and their variant, 
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youxia, consciously acted upon principles that can be summarized as altruism, courage, 
personal loyalty, integrity, sense of honor and generosity. The period of the Warring 
States witnessed the rise of the noble xia. After the founding of the Han, many former 
rebels became nobles of the new regime. They brought their xia temperament and 
behavior into the court and officialdom. At the same time, xia influence was also 
reaching down into the local levels of society. Local families of landowners joined the 
xia to form a combined force that to some extent shared power with local authorities 
in regional affairs. A new variant of xia appeared in the early Han. It was called haoxia 
(fd~), or powerful xia. Its worst form was haoqiang (~BiU), which may be translated as 
"local bully". 
The bullying inclination of the xia can be found earlier in the Warring States. The Lie 
Zi (90-i-) has a following story: Yu (J!l~) was a wealthy man of Liang (~), the capital 
city of Wei (~). One day he was entertaining friends at his residence which overlooked 
a big street. His guests were drinking, playing games and listening to music. A group 
of xia came along the street and passed by the building. One guest burst into laughter 
when he won his game. Meanwhile, by coincidence, a bird flying by dropped a dead 
rat onto the head of one of the xia group members. The group thought the dead rat 
was purposely thrown by Yu and vowed to take revenge. They set a date to come back 
with their comrades. They later attacked and killed the whole Yu family.37 The story 
shows the ease and willingness with which xia would take offense, sometimes on false 
grounds as in the above story, and their brutality in settling such matters. Even Prince 
Mengchang once led his xia retainers to massacre hundreds of people out of personal 
spite, because the victims had expressed their disappointment upon seeing the prince's 
short and slight stature. 
As shown in the previous section, in the early Han the nobles, especially the young 
princes, were attracted to the lifestyle of xia models like the four princes of the Warring 
States. However, most of these young princes lacked the qualities which the four princes 
frequently displayed. They were said to be pampered and high-handed. The Lord of 
Wuts bitter relationship with the imperial house was initiated by the death of his son 
and heir. He once sent his son to the court of Emperor Wen. The young Wu prince 
was an arrogant and bellicose man. When he played chess with the crown prince, the 
future Emperor jing, the prince ofWu actep belligerently and showed no respect to his 
host. The equally overbearing crown prince knocked the prince down and killed him 
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with the chessboard in a rage. The tragic incident made the Lord ofWu resolve to take 
. 38 
vengeance against the court. 
I found that arrogance and imperiousness were almost the defining mode of the young 
princes during the early Han period. Liu Qian (~UJ!), the crown prince of Huainan, 
was a notorious ruler in his vassal state. He monopolized state power, detaining his 
subjects arbitrarily and seizing their land and property. He was also a skilled swordsman, 
thinking himself the best in the world. When he heard Lei Pi (§t:J:JJ[), an official of the 
state, was also adept in swordcraft, he summoned him to practice together. Lei yielded 
several times but finally hit the prince by mistake. Lei knew the prince was angry 
with him and asked to join the national army on the border. The prince blocked his 
departure in order to punish him. 39 Some princes even rode roughshod over their own 
people to fulfill their unusual desires. A further example is the Lord of Jidong U*,JilQ3=:), 
son of Lord Xiao of Liang. He was so fascinated with the lives of bandits that he led his 
domestic servants and other juvenile desperadoes to loot and kill his own subjects at 
night. Over a hundred people fell prey to his sport.40 
However, a local haoqiang more often would conduct himself in subtler ways. Cuan Pu 
OI3C) is an example. His father, an army officer, was killed in a battle with the rebel 
troops of the Lord ofWu. Cuan Pu is said to have led a squad of soldiers to gallop off 
to the encampment of the Wu army. He killed many enemy soldiers and returned alone 
with a number of serious wounds on his body. His bravery earned him the reputation 
of a hero. He was stubborn and outspoken in character, despising any kind of flattery. 
He paid little respect to those powerful and influential royal relatives who were socially 
his superiors, and often picked quarrels to insult them. To those who were socially 
inferior, he always showed great respect and treated them as his equals. Sima Qian 
in his biography depicted Cuan as a man who "liked to conduct himself as a xia and 
was absolutely true to his word." Nevertheless, his friends were primarily haoxia and 
haoqiang. With his huge amount of wealth, he could keep dozens of retainers daily in 
his residence. His kinsmen and retainers tyrannized the local people, securing lands 
and property from them by force and trickery. The Cuan family is said to have become 
an evil force in the region, giving rise to the folk saying: "When the waters of the Ying 
run clear, the Cuan family is at ease; but when the waters run muddy, the entire Cuan 
family will be beheaded. ,,41 
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Although there were haoqiang like Guan Fu who used their political power and 
influence to exploit and tyrannize the people within their areas, the majority of 
haoqiang came from the lower levels of society. Their influence extended widely. Ban 
Gu, who was critical of the expansion of xia influence, once estimated that: "They 
could be found everywhere across the prefectures and states. ,,42 Even in the capital city 
Chang' an, "at the height of haoxia influence, they could be found in every alley and 
lane. ,,43 Sima Qian defined their spheres of influence in the four suburbs of the capital 
in his time: "There are the Yao family (tL3Ef\:) in the north, the Du clan (~t-t±) in the 
west, Qiu Jing (fjL~) in the south and Zhao Tuoyu (!E111m~~) in the east. ,,44 In Kuli 
Liezhuan (f~j!f~?fiJfi), or Biographies of Stern Officials, he also mentioned the Xian clan 
(I~L~) in Jinan UJiHt~), which consisted of over three hundred families. This clan was so 
powerful that the local authority was unable to control it. 45 
Sima Qian further divided the haoqiang into two major groups and described their 
characteristics. First were those who "form cliques among the powerful clans, and use 
their wealth to enslave the poor. They tyrannically and cruelly oppress the helpless and 
weak to fulfill their desires and seek their pleasure. ,,46 
The Xian clan, the four families in the suburbs of Chang' an, and most of the haoqiang 
in the prefectures and states, would fall into this group. They no longer wandered from 
place to place as did the youxia in the Warring States but established themselves locally 
as major players. They formed alliances with other influential local families to curb the 
influence of the authorities and to maintain their local interests. Their xia style of life 
helped consolidate their cliques and attract more followers. Basically, they controlled 
the neighborhood through their wealth and influence without openly challenging 
and breaking the law. In many cases, these influential families colluded with corrupt 
officials to pursue their joint interests. 
The second group consisted primarily of unruly youths. Sima Qian described them as 
follows: 
When the youths of the lanes and alleys attack passers-by or murder them 
and hide their bodies, threaten others and commit evil deeds, dig up graves 
and coin counterfeit money, form gangs to bully others, lend each other 
a hand in avenging wrongs, and think up secret ways to blackmail people 
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or drive them from the neighborhood, paying no heed to the laws and 
prohibitions, but rushing headlong to the place of execution, it is in fact all 
because of the lure of money.47 
These were ruthless young thugs, who ganged together to commit crimes against 
society. While most of them came from poor families and ended up as criminals and 
outlaws, a few succeeded in climbing into upper society, like two of Emperor Wu's 
important law enforcement ministers, Yi Zong (~~1fE) and Wang Wenshu CEilill.~T).48 
Guo Xie: the sophisticated Han xia 
The above two groups of haoxia, had close connections with each other. The thuggish 
behavior of the latter often served the interests of the former, while the former would 
often protect the latter when cornered by the authorities. Many haoxia in the first group 
originated from the latter group when they were young. The life of Guo Xie, the most 
prominent haoxia in Sima Qian's time, shows how these two groups were interlinked 
and how they developed their influence. Guo was one of the figures Sima Qian openly 
admired. The historian tried to distinguish his beloved commoner xia model from the 
notorious local bullies, who were regarded by most of the historian's contemporaries as 
the mainstream xia. Sima Qian was successful to some extent in making a distinction 
in his description of Guo Xie, but in so doing he revealed quite a few characteristics of 
the haoxia. 
Guo's detailed biography provides one of the most complete portraits of a haoxia. For 
purpose of analysis, the entire biography, based on Burton Watson's translation, is 
presented here with my comments interspersed. 
Guo Xie, whose polite name was Wengbo (~1Ij), was a native of Zhi (q!~=~). 
He was a grandson on his mother's side of the famous physiognomist Xu 
Fu (Bf~), who was skilled at reading people's faces. Guo Xie's father was 
executed in the time of Emperor Wen because of his activities as a xia. Guo 
Xie was short in stature and very quick-tempered; he did not drink wine. 
In his youth he was sullen, vindictive, and quick to anger when crossed in 
his will, and this led him to kill a great many people. In addition, he would 
take it upon himself to avenge the wrongs of his friends and conceal men 
who were fleeing from the law. He was constantly engaged in some kind of 
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evil, robbing or assaulting people, while it would be impossible to say how 
many times he was guilty of counterfeiting money or looting graves. He 
met with extraordinary luck, however, and no matter what difficulties he 
found himself in, he always managed to escape or was pardoned by a general 
amnesty. When he grew older, he had a change of heart and became much 
more upright in his conduct, rewarding hatred with virtue, giving generously 
and expecting little in return. In spite of this, he took more and more delight 
in daring and chivalrous actions. Whenever he saved someone's life, he 
would never boast of his achievements. At heart he was still as ill-tempered 
as ever, however, and his meanness would often flare forth in a sudden angry 
look. The young men of the time emulated his actions and would often take 
it upon themselves to avenge his wrongs without telling him. 
The above description displays two new features of the Han youxia. The first one is 
that xia behavior was passed on from father to son. Guo came from a youxia family 
and followed his father's footsteps to become a xia. Even his father's execution by the 
authorities did not intimidate him into giving up his xia style of life. The second is that 
he was an outlaw, who committed various kinds of crimes against the authorities and 
society, before becoming a renowned youxia. 
The son of Guo Xie's elder sister, relying upon [Guo] Xie's power and 
position, was once drinking with a man and tried to make him drink up all 
the wine. Though the man protested that it was more than he could do, Xie's 
nephew threatened him and forced him to drain the cup. In anger the luan 
drew his sword, stabbed and killed the nephew, and ran away. Xie's sister 
was furious. "POI' all my brother's so-called sense of duty," she exclaimed, 
"He allows his own nephew to be murdered and will not even go after the 
culprid" Then she threw her son's corpse into the street and refused to bury 
it, hoping to shame Xie into action. Guo Xie sent men to discover where the 
murderer was hiding and the latter, fearful of the consequences, returned of 
his own accord and reported to Xie exactly what had happened. "You were 
quite right to kill my nephew," said Xie. "He was at fauld" Then he let the 
murderer go and, laying the blame for the incident entirely on his nephew, 
took the corpse away and buried it. When men heard of this, they all 
admired Xie's righteousness and flocked about him in increasing numbers. 
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The crude and overbearing actions of Guo's nephew were typical of Han haoqiang 
descendants. Guo's reaction to the incident showed that the xia side of his character 
predominated over the haoqiang side of cruel-heartedness. This is where Guo Xie 
was different from the ordinary Han haoqiang and why he was admired by his fellow 
men and the historian as well. Forbearance and vindictiveness created a tension in his 
character. Sima Qian called this yinzei (I)~~), and he used the term twice in the first 
paragraph of Guo's biography to indicate that this tension was fundamental to his 
character. 
Whenever Guo Xie came or went, people were careful to get out of his way. 
Once, however, there was a man who, instead of moving aside, merely sat 
sprawled by the road and stared at Xie. Xie sent someone to ask the man's 
name. Xie's retainers wanted to kill the man on the spot, but Xie told them, 
"If I am not respected in the village where I live, it must be that my virtue is 
insufficient to command respect. What fault has this man committed?" Then 
he sent secret instructions to the military officials of the district, saying, 
"This man is very important to me. Whenever his turn comes for military 
service, see that he is let of£1" As a result, the man was let off from military 
service every time his turn came, and the officials made no attempt to look 
for him. The man was baffled by this and asked the reason, whereupon he 
discovered that Xie had instructed that he be excused. The man then went 
to Xie and, baring his arms, humbly apologized for his former disrespect.. 
When the young men of the district heard of this, they admired Xie's 
conduct even more. 
In Han China, streets would be evacuated for passage of ranking officials and imperial 
tours. Guo's fellow townsmen gave way to Guo whenever he was about, and it was 
regarded as unusual when someone failed to do so. He exercised his influence not only 
over the common people in his neighborhood, from whom he would neither expect 
nor tolerate any challenge, but also over the local officials, with whom he would collude 
to arrange things in his favor. Connection with government officials of different levels 
was a major source of Han haoqiang power. Guo Xie's influence was not limited to his 
neighborhood, it reached to other areas as the following passage shows: 
In Luoyang there were two families which were carrying on a feud and, 
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although ten or more of the worthy and eminent residents of the city had 
tried to act as mediators between them, they refused to accept a settlement. 
Someone asked Guo Xie to help in the matter and he went at night to 
visit the hostile families, who finally gave in and agreed to listen to Xie's 
arguments. Then he told them, "I have heard that the gentlemen of Luoyang 
have attempted to act as mediators, but that you have refused to listen to 
any of them. Now, fortunately, you have consented to pay attention to me. 
However, I would certainly not want it to appear that I came here from 
another district and tried to steal anthority from the virtuous men of your 
own city!" He therefore went away the same night so that people would not 
know of his visit, telling the feuding families, "Pay no attention to my advice 
for a while and wait until I have gone. Then let the eminent men of Luoyang 
act as your mediators and do as they say!" 
Guo's sophistication is shown in how he mediated between the feuding families. He 
demonstrated his ability to unite the different haoxia and haoqiang groups to pursue 
their common interests in the locality. This was rarely seen among the pre-Qin xia, who 
acted more out of straightforward impulsiveness. The Han xia, especially the haoxia 
type, preferred using their influence and diplomacy to resorting to force. 
Guo Xie was very respectful in his behaviour and would never venture to ride 
in a carriage when entering the office of his district. He would often journey 
to neighbouring provinces or states in answer to some request for aid. In 
such cases, if he thought he could accomplish what had been asked of him, 
he would undertake to do so, but if he thought the request was impossible, 
he would go to pains to explain the reasons to the satisfaction of the other 
party, and only then would he consent to accept food and wine. As a result, 
people regarded him with great awe and respect and vied with each other in 
offering him their services. Every night ten or more carriages would arrive at 
his gate bearing young men of the town or members of the eminent families 
of neighbouring districts who had come begging to be allowed to take some 
of Xie's guests and retainers into their own homes. 
His relation with the local authorities was one in which each used the other for their 
own ends. This coexistence with the authorities was crucial to him, as well as to the 
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Han haoxia in general, in order to maintain their influence over the common people. 
Since only rich people and officials could ride in carriages at the time, Guo entered the 
district office always on foot to show his modesty. Like Guo, the Han haoxia sought 
to share power and influence with the authorities. They accom.plished it usually by 
ensuring they did not alienate the latter. This was another characteristic of the Han 
haoxia. While the authorities may have needed the haoxia's cooperation in the local 
area to carry out duties such as collecting taxes and conscripting labor, the haoxia 
needed the authorities' backing, more often their tacit permission, to legitimize their 
activities. 
When the order went out for powerful and wealthy families in the provinces 
to be moved to Maoling (ar~), Guo's Xie's family was exempted, since his 
wealth did not come up to the specified amount. He was so well known, 
however, that the officials were afraid they would get into trouble if they 
did not order him to move. General Wei Qing spoke to the emperor on his 
behalf, explaining that Guo Xie's wealth was not sufficient to require him to 
move. But the emperor replied, "If this commoner has enough influence to 
get you to speak for him, general, he cannot be so very poor!" So in the end 
Guo Xie's family was ordered to move, and the people who came to see him 
off presented him with over 10,000,000 cash as a farewell gift. The man who 
was responsible for originally recommending Guo Xie for transportation to 
Maoling was a district official named Yang, the son of Yang Jizhu of Zhi. 
In retaliation for this, the son of Guo Xie's elder brother cut off the head of 
Yang, and as a result the Yang and the Guo families became bitter enemies. 
It is not surprising that Guo had friends like the grand general Wei Qing, since 
befriending xia and youxia was not rare among the generals in the Western Han period. 
The chief commander of the army, Zhou Yafu, had willingly made himself a friend of 
the renowned youxia Ju Meng. The astonishing fact is that Guo's family dared to kill 
the law enforcement official whom they regarded as the mastermind of their forced 
migration, without causing the local authorities to look into the incident. If the family 
of the official had not lodged a complaint directly with the throne, it seems that Guo 
would have escaped scot-free. The local authority's avoidance of the matter shows how 
great Guo's influence was in the district. 
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After Guo Xie entered the Pass, the worthy and eminent men within the 
Pass, both those who had known him before and those who had not, soon 
learned of his reputation and vied with each other in making friends with 
him. Some time after this, Yang Jizhu, the father of the official who had 
recommended that Xie be moved to Maoling, was murdered. The Yang 
family sent a letter of protest to the throne, but someone murdered the 
bearer of the letter outside the gate of the imperial palace. When the emperor 
learned of this, he sent out the legal officials to arrest Guo Xie. Xie fled and, 
leaving his mother and the other members of his family at Xiayang (~~~), 
escaped to Linjin ([4~T=f). Ji Shaogong (*iY%), who had charge of the pass 
at Linjin, had never known Guo Xie. Therefore, when Xie assumed a false 
name and asked to be allowed to go through the pass, Ji Shaogong gave him 
permission. From there Xie turned and entered the region ofTaiyuan (::tNl). 
Whenever Xie stopped anywhere in his flight, he would make his destination 
known to his host, so that as a result the law officials were able to trail him 
without difficulty. When his trail led to Ji Shaogong, however, ]i Shaogong 
committed suicide to keep from having to give any information. After some 
time, Guo Xie was captured, and a thorough investigation made of all his 
crimes. It was found, however, that all the murders he had committed had 
taken place before the last amnesty. 
Ji Shaogong was an official in charge of issuing exit permits to those who had legal 
documents to leave through the Pass. Although he and Guo Xie were completely 
unknown to each other, Ji killed himself when he learned that the person he let go 
was Guo Xie. In Sima Qian's opinion, he did this to eliminate any dues as to Guo's 
movement. Sima Qian and his contemporary historians did not leave any further 
information about Ji Shaogong. But he was obviously an official with xia spirit. 
Sacrificing oneself to rescue a friend or comrade was central to the xia code. ]i knew 
what would happen to him under Emperor Wu's severe penal code if it were found 
that he let Guo go through the Pass. In addition, possibly as a xia himself, Ji may have 
felt indebted to Guo for telling him where he was going, because this had given him 
the opportunity of informing the searchers of Guo's whereabouts. Ji also may have felt 
offended by Guo's leaving him a way out. He therefore took his own life to show that 
he was a true xia and would never betray the xia code, even though Guo tempted him 
to do so by telling him his next destination. 
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There was a certain Confucian scholar from Zhi who was sitting with the 
imperial envoys at Guo Xie's investigation. When one of Xie's retainers 
praised Xie, the Confucian scholar remarked, "Guo Xie does nothing but 
commit crimes and break the law! How can anyone call him a worthy man?" 
The retainer happened to overhear his words and later killed the Confucian 
scholar and cut out his tongue. The law officials tried to lay the blame on 
Xie, though as a matter of fact he did not know who had committed the 
murder. The murderer disappeared, and in the end no one ever found out 
who he was. The officials finally submitted a report to the throne declaring 
that Xie was innocent of the charges brought against him, but the imperial 
secretary Gongsun Hong objected, saying, "Xie, although a commoner, has 
taken the authority of the government into his own hands in his activities 
as a xia, killing anyone who gave him so much as a cross look. Though he 
did not know the man who murdered the Confucian scholar, his guilt is 
greater than if he had done the crime himself. He should be condemned as 
a treasonable and unprincipled crimina!!" In the end Guo Xie and all the 
members of his family were executed.49 
The Confucian scholar was merely stating the obvious in refuting the claim that 
Guo was a virtuous man. His refutation had little influence on the imperial envoys 
investigating Guo's case. Nevertheless, he was not spared by the Guo's followers. This 
was too much for a regime which sought to expand its authority. Gongsun Hong's 
rationale for executing Guo well expressed the mentality of the regime: It could not 
coexist with a force which rose from the grass-roots level of society and stole from it a 
part of its authority in ruling the land. The Han authorities had every reason to think 
the xia, and their variant forms haoxia and haoqiang, were the kind of challenge they 
must respond to ruthlessly. 
Suppression of the xia in the Han Dynasty 
Sima Qian depicted the social situation in the early Han in the following remark: "At 
that time, the net of the law was slack and the people were rich. It was possible for men 
to use their wealth to exploit others and to accumulate huge fortunes. Some, such as 
the great landowners and powerful families, were able to do anything they pleased in 
the countryside." 50 Sima Qian here was primarily referring to the haoxia and haoqiang 
groups, who had banded together with the influential local families, and gangs of 
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unruly youths. These non-official forces challenged the power of the government in the 
locality. Their suppression became inevitable. 
The large-scale suppression of these local forces was initiated under the reign of 
Emperor Jing (i~;t1i'f 151-141 B.C.). The previous half century witnessed the Han 
empire moving from recovery to prosperity. Economic development paved the way for 
political expansion of the central government. Emperor Jing was a strong-willed and 
harsh ruler. Right after he ascended the throne, he launched a campaign to reduce the 
power and territory of his vassal lords. This caused the rebellion led by the Lords of 
Wu and Chu. The emperor suppressed the rebellion, finally eliminating the threat to 
the center from the recalcitrant vassal states headed by members of the royal house. 
After removing the main obstacle to his political goals, the emperor turned to make the 
youxia and haoqiang his second target of attack. 
The method usually taken by Emperor Jing to suppress these forces was to send 
what were known as stern (or "cruel") officials (kuli ~~~) into the areas where xia or 
haoqiang influence constituted a threat to his government. Zhi Du (~5tl)) was the first 
such official entrusted by Emperor Jing. The Biographies of Stern Officials in the Shi Ji 
record that: 
The Xian clan of Ji'nan, consisting of over 300 households, was notorious 
for its power and lawlessness, and none of the 2,000 local officials could 
do anything to control it. Emperor Jing thereupon appointed Zhi Du as 
governor of Ji'nan. As soon as he reached the province, he executed the worst 
offenders among the Xian clan, along with the members of their families, 
and the rest were all overwhelmed with fear. 51 
The emperor also appointed other stern officials such as Ning Cheng (~nX:) and 
Zhouyang You (Jj!fJ I)~ EI=I) to the regions to wipe out xia or haoqiang forces. However, the 
suppression of local haoqiang influence achieved only superficial and temporary results. 
Sima Qian put it ironically in the Biographies of the Youxia: 
At the time the Xian clan ofJi'nan and the Zhou Yong (mJJI) family of Chen 
(I~) were both noted for their great power and influence. When Emperor 
Jing heard of this, he sent an envoy to execute all the members. After this, 
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Han Wupi (!j!YM~~~$) of Liang (W2), Xue Xiong (f:i*£) ofYangdi (I~}~~), Han 
Ru (~~H~) of Shan (pj{) and various members of the Bai clan (~'lf B) of Dai (1-t), 
. 51 
came to prommence. 
In fact, many noble families, local government officials and haoqiang were bound by 
common economic and political interests, although they were often in conflict in local 
power struggles. The members of the first two groups not only protected the interests 
of the haoqiang when they were in conflict together with the central government, but 
also involved themselves in haoqiang activities. With the help of the two ruling groups, 
haoqiang used every avenue of influence to strike back at individual officials who were 
sent by the central government to diminish or eliminate their influence. Almost all the 
so-called kuli listed in Sima Qian's biographies who established their fame through 
suppressing local haoqiang (and sometimes even in-laws of the royal house) were 
eventually executed by imperial order. Zhi Du's harsh interrogation of the Prince of 
Linjiang (~%iI3~), who had been deposed as crown prince to Emperor ling, forced the 
young man to kill himself. The prince's powerful grandmother, Empress Dowager Dou, 
resented this bitterly and eventually found an excuse to put Zhi Du to death. With 
Zhi Du's death, those powerful families and haoqiang (*1-~ ~~), who once suffered 
from his terror, resumed their old vices. 53 The emperor's campaign against the haoqiang 
relied chiefly upon a handful of stern and ruthless officials. However, by the time of his 
death the emperor had not succeeded in curbing the influence of the haoqiang. 
Emperor Jing's successor, Emperor Wu U:lff:tw r 141-87 B.C.), continued his 
father's undertakings in this respect. He readjusted his father's anti-haoqiang policy 
and coordinated it with other measures. First, Emperor Wu promoted many stern 
officials to key posts of law enforcement at both the central and local levels. Ning 
Cheng and Zhouyang You, the two most notorious stern officials from Emperor 
Jing's reign, were promoted by Emperor Wu. Zhouyang was described at the time of 
Emperor Wu's enthronement by his contemporary Sima Qian as "the mo'st cruel and 
tyrannical official." He would twist the law to have people he favored set free even if 
they were serious criminals and he would bend the law to any lengths to destroy those 
he hated. His record of killing haoqiang in his tenure of various local offices drew the 
attention of the emperor. 54 Because of the emperor's encouragement and advocacy of 
harsh governance, his officials became cruel and often bloodthirsty. Sima Qian stated 
that "the officials for the most part were men of the same type as Ning Cheng and 
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Zh \T ,,55 ouyang IOU. 
Zhang Tang (*i~) was the most repressive of Emperor Wu's official. He undertook the 
investigation and trial of many important cases such as those of the Lord of Huainan 
and the Lord of Jiangdu. On every occasion he was able to "uproot all the adherents" 
U*1i!:5t~) and "go deep to the bottom of the case" (1=Yf;H~*). He was thus highly 
regarded by the emperor, who appointed him deputy prime minister and kept him 
in that post for seven years. Zhang masterminded many specific measures against 
law-breakers, such as those who failed to report their holdings accurately under the 
Declaration of Property Decree (E~-%). Eliminating local haoqiang forces was the 
rationale behind these measures. 56 
Emperor Wu also deliberately put officials who had formerly been xia or haoqiang 
themselves in charge of suppressing the haoqiang. Yi Zong and Wang Wenshu, 
mentioned in the previous section, were examples of this. The first action Yi took 
after assuming office in Henei OiiJ pq) district as duwei (~~~t: chief commander for 
local security and law enforcement) was to execute the whole family of the local 
haoqiang Xiang (fl~). Later the emperor appointed him governor of Dingxiang (JE~) 
Prefecture, where haoqiang forces were rampant. Soon after he arrived in his office, he 
sent troops to surround the prison and seized over two hundred men accused of major 
and minor crimes, along with another two hundred or so of their friends and relatives 
who had slipped into the jail to visit the prisoners. He accused the latter group of 
plotting to free those prisoners who deserved to die, and ordered all of them executed 
along with the two hundred prisoners. After this massacre, the remaining haoqiang in 
the area were all obedient to his rule. 57 
Wang Wenshu, the most feared legal official of Emperor Wu, also began his life 
as a youthful xia. He carried the ruthlessness and cruelty of his past into his later 
career as a law enforcement official. His biography contains terrible stories of his 
cold-bloodedness. He had many people arrested. Over 1,000 families were implicated. 
Most of them were executed during the first winter after he was appointed to his office. 
He was very disappointed when the winter was over: 
When the beginning of spring came Wang stamped his foot and sighed, "Ah! 
If only I could make the winter last one more month I could finish my work 
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to satisfaction!" Such was his fondness for slaughter and demonstrations of 
power and his lack of love for others. When the emperor heard of this he 
concluded that Wang was a man of ability and transferred him to the post of 
zhongwei (1=j=l1~:I"), the military commander of the capita1. 58 
Wang's biography continues to tell us that during his tenure he took in many equally 
ruthless officials as his aides in suppressing the local haoqiang. They put many haoqiang 
and their families into prison. Most of them ended up either being executed or dying 
in prison, with few leaving the prison alive. Under the personal encouragement of 
Emperor Wu, those leading regional officials who were desirous of impressing the 
emperor with their harshness all followed Wang's policy of" ruling with terror" (tUR~1.?, 
i§).59 It is said that when Sima Qian concluded the Biographies of Stern OfficiaLs in the 
later years of the emperor's reign, there were around seventy thousand people detained 
by the central law enforcement ministry alone and over one hundred thousand by 
its subordinate departments. Among them were many from throughout the country 
believed to be haoqiang. Although the forces of the local haoqiang were heavily hit by 
the repression, many managed to survive and eventually regained their lost ground. 
Emperor Wu took a further measure to control the local haoqiang forces. The emperor 
was under the strong influence of necromancers and alchemists. One year after 
he ascended the throne, he began to construct his mausoleum in Maoling, to the 
northwest of the capital. He encouraged people to migrate to the place by awarding 
them money and free land. Ten years later, his newly appointed policy advisor Zhufu 
Yan (:=EXill ?-127 B.C.) submitted a memorial to the throne suggesting: 
Now that Your Majesty's mausoleum has been established at Maoling in the 
suburbs, it would be advisable to gather together the wealthy and powerful 
families and the troublemakers among the people from all over the empire 
and resettle them at Maoling. In this way you will increase the population of 
the capital area and at the same time prevent the spread of evil and vicious 
ways in the provinces. This is called preventing danger without resorting to 
. h 60 punls ments. 
The emperor adopted this proposal and issued an edict ordering haoqiang and other 
influential families whose property value exceeded three million jin to move to Maoling 
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under the direct surveillance of the central government. G1 The significance of this 
measure was more political than economic. Many haoqiang families were pulled out of 
their power bases and most of them became less influential, or even lost all influence 
in their new place of abode. Large-scale forced migration of powerful families was 
frequently implemented, and the biographic annals of Emperor Wu contain a specific 
account of one such in his later years. G2 Haoqiang families were not only forced to 
move to within arm's reach of the emperor; some were also moved to the northwest 
frontier. In the fifth year ofYuanshou (:J[J~: 118 B.C.), the emperor ordered that "the 
treacherous be moved from across the country to the borders in company with officials 
and commoners."G3 Many youxia were believed among them. Li Ling (*I~$t) once 
reported to the emperor that "those I command at the border were all brave warriors, 
excellent soldiers and swordsmen from Jingchu Of'ij~). They are able to catch tigers and 
h· "G4 It any target. 
As the result of Emperor Wu's various measures of suppression, the regional influence 
of the xia and haoqiang was reduced in the later years of his reign. However, it was still 
far from being eliminated. Sima Qian made the point clearly that after the execution 
of Guo Xie the xia were still numerous across the land. G5 Under the reign of Emperor 
Xuan (?g~1K1(i r. 74-49), the grandson of Emperor Wu, the influence of haoqiang once 
again began to pose a threat to the local government in many areas. The Han Shu has 
the following account: 
In Zhuo Prefecture (i%~:il~ in Hebei), there were two big families, the 
Western Gao (f§i%.t\) and Eastern Gao (JRi%.t\). All officials from the 
prefecture level avoided them out of fear, never daring to offend them. Those 
officials would say: "We would rather disappoint the governor than the great 
haoqiang families." The retainers of the two Gao families unscrupulously 
committed robberies and thievery and would flee to the Gao fortresses 
whenever discovered. No official dared to chase them. It had been the 
situation for quite a long time. Nobody dared walk on the street without 
. 1 d GG carryl11g weapons at t le rea y. 
This situation further worsened under the reign of Emperor Cheng (ii)1X;1if r. 33-7 
B.C.). The influence of haoxia and haoqiang even infiltrated into the capital Chang'an, 
under the very eyes of the central government, as related in the Han Shu: 
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Between Yongshi (7i(~f::l 16-13 B.C.) and Yuanyan (nJJ1 12-9 B.C.), 
Emperor Cheng was weary of holding court. The influence of imperial 
relatives prevailed. The Hongyang (~II~) and Changzhong (:L~1$) brothers 
made friends with frivolous xia and sheltered desperadoes. In Beidi (~t 
1m) a haoqiang named Hao Shang (if5 itli) and his followers killed the chief 
of Yiqu (~~) with his wife and children, six people in all, out of revenge. 
Yet, Hao could still come and go in Chang'an. The office of deputy prime 
minister sent its officials to chase the culprits. An imperial order was also 
issued to arrest Hao. It took a long time to bring him to justice. The number 
of villains was gradually growing in Chang' an. The youths from the alleys 
ganged up in groups to kill officials. They were hired to take revenge. They 
cast pellets [to decide what to do]. The red pellet went to cut down a military 
officer, the black one to cut down a civic official, and the white one to 
arrange the funeral of a fellow gangster. As dusk came to the city, they turned 
out in a cloud of dust to rob people. The dead and injured were left lying on 
the street. Alarms were sounded all the time. 67 
Faced with this rampant development of haoxia influence and activity, the government 
of Emperor Cheng seemed unable to do more than appoint strong officials. However, 
the government was now much weaker and had little confidence of crushing the haoxia 
and haoqiang forces. It was capable now of securing order only in the capital and the 
neighboring areas. When Wang Zun (3:.$) was appointed mayor of the capital city (~ 
~bjl), he immediately arrested and executed a group of haoxia in the city: Yu Zhang (~ 
~), Zhang Hui (~Im), Zhao Jundu (Jl:j1JEPli~) and Jia Ziguang Cl~T:Yt), who "as famous 
haoxia in Chang' an were all engaged in taking revenge and retaining assassins. ,,68 Years 
later, an even harsher official Yin Shang (jl:l) was appointed to the post. The difficult 
situation he confronted is described in the continuation of the above account in the 
Han Shu: 
Yin Shang was selected to be the mayor of Chang'an (~~bj=l') from the top of 
the recommendation list and allowed to do whatever he would see fit. Upon 
arriving at his office, he built up prisons, which were several-zhang-deep 
pits surrounded by a wall with a huge stone covering on top. He named 
them huxue (JjE1\), or the tiger's den. Then he instructed his aides and 
various levels of officials to list all those frivolous youths and evil juveniles, 
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unregistered merchants, and those wearing bright suits of armor and carrying 
weapons. Several hundred were listed. Yin Shang assembled all officials in 
Chang'an one morning with hundreds of carriages, sending them to take 
all the people on the list into custody. He accused them all of collaborating 
with the rebels. He read the list and released one from every group of ten. 
The remaining people were put into the huxue, one hundred for each. All 
the huxue were covered by huge stones. When the stones were removed days 
later, all of them were found dead with their bodies lying on top of each 
other. The bodies were all buried near a monastery at Hengdong ('liiJR). The 
names of the dead were left at their burying place. A hundred days later, the 
families of the dead were allowed to take back the bodies. They were wailing 
while the passers-by all lamented. A ballad spread in the city of Chang'an: 
"Where to find the place where they have died? It will be in the grounds for 
the youth of Hengdong. If you behave yourself recklessly when you are alive, 
where else will your body be found when you are dead?,,69 
Yin's suppression was so cruel that the event became an often-used allusion in later 
youthful xia literature. Those released by Yin were either the leading haoxia, or the 
children of former officials or rich families. They escaped punishment. The pardoned 
haoxia leaders were later recruited to pursue and capture their fellow haoxia, rebels 
and other outlaws.70 During the later years of the Western Han, the common strategy 
adopted by the regime in suppressing haoxia and haoqiang was to split the local 
haoqiang forces and to use one group to combat another. In Ban Gu's Biographies of the 
Youxia, the three most famous haoxia of the time, Lou Hu (1~MIi), Chen Zun (I~~) 
and Yuan She (JJJ{rW) were all appointed to local offices. 
From Emperor Jing to the usurper Wang Mang (.±#f r. 5-23), suppression of local 
xia forces was the consistent policy of the Han regime. Along with the xia, haoxia and 
haoqiang, numerous innocent people died at the hands of stern and repressive officials. 
Bao Xuan Uuffill) , an official in the court of Emperor Ai (il-R1ff r. 6-1 B.C.), once 
pointed out in a memorial to the throne that there were "seven major causes of death" 
(1=::JE): first was death caused by torture by the stern officials, second by excessive 
punishments, and third by the framing of innocent people. 71 The first three causes 
were all related to the suppression policy of the government. Atrocities committed by 
the government were the main cause of unnatural death at the time, according to Bao. 
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However, the sustained nature of this suppression also shows that the local haoxia forces 
stubbornly resisted over the long term any attempt by the government to strip them 
of their economic and political interests. Both Sima Qian and Ban Gu noticed that 
even under such harsh measures, as one group of xia fell, others rose, as if they were 
unconquerable. The Western Han was the one time in history in which local xia forces 
constituted a real threat to the regime, which is why they drew such extraordinary 
attention from the authorities as well as the official historians. 
After the Western Han, while the xia continued to exist, especially in the lower social 
levels, no further biographies of xia were written by official historians. Many reasons 
explain this silence. Among them three stand out. One was the suppressive government 
policy towards the xia and other non-governmental forces in the succeeding Eastern 
Han. The second was the increasing dominance of Confucianism in the ideological 
system, which stifled political dissent among the literati. The third was that the xia 
themselves underwent great changes during the period and they became far removed 
from their classical model in the pre-Qin eras. The xia were gradually disappearing 
from the mainstream political scene in real world, but meanwhile the idealization and 
mythologization of the xia began. 
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